The following is a paper I wrote for my class this week on American Foreign Policy in the Developing World. It remains largely unedited, though I made a few minor corrections and changes. A post about this weekend will be up later this evening or tomorrow morning. Here is a link to the QDDR homepage if you feel it would help give context to this - fair warning: even the executive summary is 18 pages. click here
Certainly, the positive aspects of the QDDR cannot be undervalued. There are three aspects, or broad goals, that I believe will be particularly useful for American foreign policy going forward. The first is the growth of the civilian sector response to international crises relative to the size of the United States’ militaristic response. I believe it is tremendously important from here forward that America clearly shows a civilian mission and care in our involvement rather than simply engaging in a forceful plan.
Second, the proposed promotion of USAID to be a dominant force in United States’ response policies allows for a greater amount of flexibility and focus within the State Department. Taking some pressure off of State in a few areas would allow their efforts to be clearer and better funded concerning other issues. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the increased focus on prevention and stabilization is one that should have always been at the core of American foreign policy. Though this is a rather difficult task, and perhaps it is even more difficult to prove its effectiveness, such techniques are the best way to both ensure American security and provide useful avenues to promote American interests abroad.
Yet despite these positive aspects within the QDDR, there are still a number of questions left unanswered. Perhaps the most obvious is the issue of funding. During her visit, Ms. Karin Von Hippel made it perfectly clear that certain civilian groups (if not most, if not all) do not receive the amount of funding they believe is necessary for a maximum amount of success. The motives behind the QDDR can be as innovative or noble as possible, yet without the funding they require, the commitment of any administration to the principles outlined in the QDDR could easily be called into question.
Still, budget issues are a matter of politics, and in the face of an economic crisis, programs requiring new budgets and more money will be difficult to sell on the congressional floor. Thus, my main concerns with the advancements of the QDDR are structural rather than ones concerning implementation. In particular, my concerns pertain to the prevailing top-down structure of American international diplomacy and response, as well as the general adherence to the need for a specific type of framework.
One sentence on the first page of the QDDR Executive Summary leads directly towards my frustration with both of these issues. It reads: “From Washington, colleagues are sending strategic guidance and resources.” Obviously it is necessary for Washington to be the main provider of resources, but strategic guidance? Earlier on that very page the expertise of the officials in the actual region was lauded, and the summary goes to great lengths to describe how a variety of experts work together in a specific area that they know and understand well.
Why, then, is Washington sending strategic guidance to these people? Should it not be the other way around? If by “strategic guidance” the QDDR meant principles and goals the United States wishes to achieve in a specific region, this would make far more sense. But I believe that this sentence establishes a hierarchy in which Washington sets the framework for a conflict-prone region or country, and the people there must operate within this framework, despite the fact that they would be able to establish a more effective or complete framework on their own.
I should note that I do not doubt that those in Washington receive copious amounts of information from the field, nor do I doubt they are intelligent people capable of producing an effective framework. Furthermore, I understand that a reverse system would require a substantial amount of trust that those in the field would continue to have the best interests of America in mind, despite living and being immersed in another country and culture. Still, my prevailing perception is a lack of freedom of action in some places acts as a hindrance to those in the field and American interests in general.
Furthermore, I believe such an adherence to frameworks in general also serves as a significant hindrance. Throughout the QDDR and Ms. Hippel’s visit, there was a stress on the innovative programs American is undertaking when it comes to developing countries. Focusing on prevention and stabilization can certainly be categorized as an innovation. Yet America is constantly concerned with implementing the proper framework and developing an over-arching strategy. The fact is, there no longer is a functional place for any such thing, and if the United States was indeed striving for innovation it would do away with such ambitions.
Countless times in class someone has noted that the response to a crisis “depends on the situation”. It is time American policy reflected this reality. Whether this is through a number of small groups designed to anticipate as many preventable situations as possible (perhaps like Ms. Hippel’s underfunded, undervalued Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations), or a larger and more effectively trained civilian unit available for rapid deployment, true changes need to be made. Creating new frameworks is not truly innovative. Rather, it appears to me, Washington has realized 20 years after the end of the end of the Cold War that a much more diverse system is now in place and it requires a new response. Calling the QDDR an innovation for the twenty-first century is a vast overstatement. Instead, the QDDR has helped America catch up to the current problems in the developmental world. It seems only necessary to ask the burning question on my mind – how many times throughout the twenty-first century will further “innovative” changes be necessary?
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